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REMARKS
A PLANETARY SURVEY OF FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE: IF MEN ARE FROM MARS
AND WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS, WHERE DO
LAWYERS COME FROM?*
The Honorable Sam Joynert
'Tis woman's strongest vindication for speaking that the world needs to
hear her voice .... The world has had to limp along with the wobbling
gait and the one-sided hesitancy of a man with one eye. Suddenly the
bandage is removed from the other eye and the whole body is filled with
light. It sees a circle where before it saw a segment The darkened eye
restored, every member rejoices with it.'
One can think of the oboe and the clarinet as different Yet when they
play together, there is a sound that's not either one of them, but it doesn't
dissolve the identity of either instrument 2
* These remarks were presented at the Oklahoma Bar Association Women in Law Conference in Tul-
sa, Oklahoma, on August 28, 1997. They are published here substantially as delivered. To aid the reader,
footnotes have been added.
t United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The writer acknowledges with
gratitude the editorial assistance of law clerks Tammy D. Barrett and Douglas M. Todd.
1. ANNA JULIA COOPER, A VOICE FROM THE SOUTH n.vii (Negro University Press 1969). This United
States educator, feminist and author was one of the earliest African American woman to earn a Ph.D. Her
teachings and writings disclosed a modem view of racism and sexism in Western civilization.
2. Barbara Dolan and Melissa Ludtke, Coming From A Different Place, TIME, Fall 1990, at 66 (quoting
Carol Gilligan in a special issue on "Women: The road ahead").
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I. INTRODUCTION
John Gray's popular book, Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus,3
is about the difficulty men and women have communicating with each other. I
have twisted the title a bit to suggest the ambiguity and role-conflict some
women suffer when they make the law their chosen profession.
John Gray compares men to Mars, the Roman god of war, and women to
Venus, the Roman goddess of love and beauty. The practice of law, especially
trial practice, is adversarial and more attuned to Mars than to Venus. If John
Gray is right, there is trouble ahead. Must a woman litigator be other than who
she wants to be or other than her natural instincts and talents have prepared her
to be? Must she "act like a man" to be successful in the courtroom? Are there
real differences between men and women which are ignored by judges and
which put women at a disadvantage in the courtroom? How has the law been
impacted by the large influx of women?
This article will explore these questions through three inquiries:
1. Are men and women different? This is not, in the parlance, a slam
dunk-not as obvious and easy to understand as one might think. Men
and women are different, but not as different as popular culture suggests.
2. This difference, combined with the large influx of women into the
law, has generated a philosophy of law called feminist jurisprudence.
What are these contributions that feminist thought brings to the law?
3. Are gender differences properly acknowledged and responded to in
the courts? Are women placed at a disadvantage because of their gender?
To what extent does gender bias impact our courts?
A quick note on the source of my interest in these issues is appropriate.
My Master's study and thesis were directed to the ethical training of students in
law school.4 I found law school instruction excessively amoral, with insuffi-
cient exploration of the ethical impact of legal reasoning and choices. My thesis
posited that more humanities in law school would help fill this void and pro-
duce a more value-conscious graduate. Literature, poetry, even the visual arts,
would produce a wisdom not found in the United States Code or in Circuit case
law. Feminist jurisprudence was one of several humane/humanistic avenues I
found helpful in making values more central to legal education.
My interest goes beyond the classroom. Feminist thought is not only a
women's issue. It impacts men and women equally on many fronts in and out
of the law school. Most importantly, as a judge, I want to ensure that our
courts, that is, my court, is sensitive to gender differences and pressures.
3. JOHN GRAY, PH.D., MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND GETTING WHAT YOU WANT IN YOUR RELATIONSHIPS (1992).
4. A copy of the thesis, "Moral Development Can Be Enhanced by Liberal Arts and Humanities In Law
School" is on file at the Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma. See also Sam A.
Joyner, Law School and Legal Ethics - A Part of the Illness or the Cure, 60 OKLA. B. J. 743 (1989).
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II. MALE/FEMALE DFERENCES
A. Popular Culture
Popular comment on male/female differences abounds. During an interview
on the Today Show about the demise of her relationship with Don Johnson,
Melanie Griffith proclaimed, "You know, men and women are just from differ-
ent planets." Browsing a local book store, I encountered a work by Erica Jong,
a salacious or savvy writer on women's issues, depending on your point of
view. Jong concludes, "Men and Women, Women and Men-no-it will never
work." A feminist friend once said to me, "Sam, I have nothing against men -
in fact I like men. They can reach the top shelf, carry heavy things and open a
jar of pickles." Apparently, men are valuable for some things. The joke (I think
it was a joke) points to obvious physical differences. Men are typically taller
and bigger, with louder and deeper voices. Do court facilities properly deal with
these differences? This question is reserved for later.
Thus, men and women are different. We could stop there and join Maurice
Chevalier, the French raconteur and movie star, when he says, "Ces men and
ces women are different-but oh la la-vive, la differ~nce!"5 But that does
little to inform the situation. I will conclude this article in agreement with Che-
valier, but not in the same context.
B. Carl G. Jung
There are those with more expertise than Melanie Griffith and Maurice
Chevalier who confirm that differences exist between men and women beyond
the familiar anatomical ones. One of the first and most prominent was Swiss
psychologist, Carl Gustave Jung.6 If you have heard people at a cocktail party
saying their anima or animus is out of balance, or that they are Jungian, C.G.
Jung is the fellow that gave them their talk.
Jung found the human mind or psyche7 divided into opposites. Each of us
has rational, logical capacities expressed through conscious, well thought-out
action. Each of us has an intuitive, feeling side which functions most often on
an unstructured, subconscious level.' To Jung, these capacities are innate. Some
people are well balanced and able to express both attitudes. More often, one is
more developed than the other. The extent to which one predominates deter-
mines our personality type. One is not better or worse than the other. They are
just different.'
5. Gigi, a 1958 movie directed by Vincente Minnelli and distributed by MGM Home Entertainment.
6. See CARL G. JUNG, C.G. JUNG SPEAKING: INTERVIEWS AND ENCOUNTERS (William McGuire and
R.F.C. Hull eds., 1977).
7. In this article, mind, psyche and personality are used interchangeably. This is not to belie Psyche's
origin as the lover of Cupid (Eros) in Greek mythology, who ultimately becomes the personification of the
soul. See ROBERT B. BELL, WOMEN OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY (1995).
8. See generally FRIEDA FORDHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGY (3rd ed. 1966).
9. See generally CARL G. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES (1971).
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According to Jung, the logical, structured thought process is typically
associated with men, and can be impersonal, analytical, and calculating. The
opposite mode of processing information is more intuitive and caring, and is
typically associated with those born female." However, each of us expresses
these male and female psychic properties. The healthiest psyche or personality
is one in which these opposites are balanced and complementary. Even though
the one is more often dominant in men and the other in women, there are wom-
en in whom the "analytical" thought process may be dominant and men who
are more feeling and intuitive. The distinction does not always fall along gender
lines. Jung does not address whether these distinctions have a cultural or genet-
ic basis.
Whether you accept Jung's science or not, there is allegorical validity in
the premise that there is wisdom of the head and wisdom of the heart. Either
one, alone, leads to excess-arid intellect from the head or emotions pouring
from the heart. Men and women alike should strive to be heart-smart as well as
head-smart. Four hundred years ago, Pascal summed it up in one sentence: "The
heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of.""
C. Carol Gilligan
Jung's work was not directed toward the law or women in the law. Devel-
opmental psychologist Carol Gilligan did just that in her 1982 book In a Dif-
ferent Voice.2 Gilligan analyzed the different thought processes that men and
women use and how those differences impact women in the law. Gilligan
worked at Harvard with Lawrence Kohlberg at a time when his cognitive theo-
ries of moral development through stages were becoming widely accepted.'3
Gilligan challenged Kohlberg's all-male studies and his tacit assumption that his
male models of moral development applied equally to women. 4 To the con-
trary, Gilligan's work found moral development to proceed quite differently in
women, and, in the process, she provided a major taproot in moral psychology
to which many feminist theorists, in and out of the law, quickly attached them-
selves. 5
From empirical study, Gilligan found men and women to have a different
approach to decision-making and problem-solving-that women speak "with a
10. See generally EDWARD F. EDINGER, AN OUTLINE OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 12 (1968).
11. ROBERT C. SOLOMON AND CATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 187 (1996)
(Oxford Univeristy Press).
12. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
13. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, MORAL STAGES AND MORALIZATION- THE COON1TIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES contained in
MAN, MORALITY, AND SOCIErY (Thomas Lickona, ed., 1976). See also LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, MORAL STAG-
ES: A CURRENT FORMULATION AND A RESPONSE TO CRITICS (1983).
14. See Martha Siegel, A Practitioner's Guide to Feminist Jurisprudence, 37 BOSTON BJ., Sept.-Oct.
1993, at 6, 8.
15. See Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373, 1380
(1986); see also Siegel, supra note 14, at 7.
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different voice."' 6 Women use different criteria and modes of reasoning to
make moral decisions than men. The feminine decision-making process is based
on preserving relationships, nurturing, individual responsibility, and expresses
an ethic of caring and compassion that is concerned more with the results of a
particular factual situation than with strictly enforcing universal rules." The
male process is based more on individually-owned rights and the application of
universal rules.'
According to Gilligan, women have a different way of "knowing" from
which they draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority. 9 They
rely more on intuition and feelings, while a man may rely more on observable
"facts" and universal rules. Women may be more concerned about whether the
results are fair in a particular case.20 Men may be more concerned that the rule
was followed properly to ensure fairness overall, even though the results in the
particular case are a bit skewed.2' Gilligan is unclear about whether these dif-
ferences are biological or social in origin."
Few scholars now accept Gilligan's empirical conclusions without ques-
tion.' Social psychologist Carol Tavris considered Gilligan's work in detail
and she agrees with psychologist Martha Mednick in finding that Gilligan's
"different voice" has little scientific base.
There is much that I admire about Gilligan's work, particularly its ex-
panded vision of the importance of an ethic of care in moral reasoning.
But Mednick is right: The popularity of this theory does not rest on its
scientific merit On the contrary, research in recent years casts consider-
able doubt on the notion that men and women differ appreciably in the
moral reasoning, or that women have a permanently different voice be-
cause of their early closeness to their mothers.24
Tavris points out that there is danger in the appealing theory that women have a
natural capacity to be more loving, are more connected and peaceful, speak in a
different voice, and have different ways of knowing and proving things or
reaching moral decisions. Now described by many as "cultural feminism,"
16. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 2.
17. See id. at 29 and 164.
18. See id. at 25-51, 164 and 174.
19. See also MARY FIELD BELENKY ET. AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986).
20. See GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 24.
21. See id. at 25-51.
22. See id. at 2.
23. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 871 n.174 (listing
critics of Gilligan who argue that Gilligan's material does not support her thesis and that she exaggerates the
male/female duality).
24. CAROL TAVRiS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN-WHY WOMEN ARE NOT THE BETTER SEX, THE
INFERIOR SEX, OR THE OPPOSITE SEX 83 (1992).
25. For an excellent article on the rise of cultural feminism, see Alice Echols, THE TAMING OF THE ID:
FEMINIST SEXUAL POLITICS: 1968-1983 IN C.S. VANCE (ED.), PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE
SEXUALITY. BOSTON: ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL (1984). For an excellent overview of the debate over
cultural feminism see Linda Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural
Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1993). For a partial list of
critics see id. at 4 n.26. Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989) (including
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this is theory, she complains, lets men off the hook in their obligation to share
child care and family obligations equally, ignores men's softer side, and sup-
ports the old idea that women are best suited to certain kinds of jobs.' Even if
we agree that Gilligan's science is a bit skewed, her work has expanded our
awareness of the covert, often unintentional, effect of gender-based factors in
the law.
Gilligan confirms John Gray's description of what happens when Mars and
Venus try to communicate.
My research suggests that men and women may speak different languages
that they assume are the same, using similar words to encode disparate
experiences of self and social relationships. They contain a propensity for
systematic mistranslation. '
You and your spouse or significant other may have "a propensity for systematic
mistranslation."
D. Male/Female Allegories
Another wonderful perspective on male/female differences-not as scientif-
ic, but certainly more entertaining-can be found in Mark Twain's The Com-
plete Diaries of Adam and Eve." Twain has Adam complaining about this
long-haired creature that follows him around and never quits talking. Eve de-
scribes this man-creature she adores for no reason she can identify, and ob-
serves that "he is not bright and he speaks little so that others will not know he
is not bright."
It is not far from Adam and Eve to the tale of Jacob and Sarah, another
,bible-based man/woman allegory. Ex-Dominican priest Matthew Fox draws a
distinction between climbing Jacob's ladder and dancing Sarah's circle." Jacob
dreamed of "a ladder [which] was set on the earth with its top reaching to heav-
en; and behold the angels of God were ascending and descending on it."3'
Good Christians ever since have been singing "We are climbing Jacob's lad-
der," choosing what Fox describes as a male-created symbol for hierarchy in
the church and in society, and the source of many ills in both.32
Williams' curious call for 'Gilligan in reverse'). For a comprehensive defense of cultural feminism see Leslie
Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law,
15 VERT. L. REV. 1 (1990). In her overview of the debate over cultural feminism, Lacey concludes with a
partial defense of Gilligan and the cultural feminist. "Cultural feminism has made significant contributions to
feminist dialogue and continues to provide a perspective which illuminates at least part of many women's
experiences"... [and has] "made important contributions to the goal of restructuring our legal system."
Lacey, supra note 25, at 16, 18.
26. See id. TAVRIs, supra note 24, at 332.
27. Gilligan, supra note 12 at 173.
28. MARK TWAIN, THE COMPLETE SHORT STORMS OF MARK TWAIN 273-295 (Charles Neider ed.,
1957).
29. Id. at 286.
30. MATTHEW Fox, A SPIRITUALITY CALLED COMPASSION AND THE HEALING OF THE GLOBAL VILLAGE
36 (1979).
31. Genesis 28:12.
32. FOX, supra note 30, at 41.
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Instead of climbing Jacob's ladder, we should be "dancing Sarah's circle,"
which Fox finds in the description of Sarah's joy at giving birth at the age of
90, with her 100 year-old husband, Abraham, after having been barren for those
90 years.33 Fox complains that the ladder-climbing symbol implies a Sisyphian
experience of trying to get to the top with the traditional male attributes of
competition, elitism, and hierarchy.' Survival, especially at the top, is precari-
ous and requires ruthless individualism. Sarah's circle emphasizes community
and equality, a circle with no up or down, no beginning or end. You can dance,
you can talk, you can relate eye-to-eye in Sarah's circle, none of which is pos-
sible while climbing Jacob's ladder. 5
It was exciting to find this same allegoric duality repeated millennia later
in Gilligan's work. This time it is Jake's ladder and Amy's web. Gilligan de-
scribes Jake's ladder as representing the hierarchical ordering of individual
rights and the male-created justice-ethic that protects that ordering of rights.'
Amy's web represents the ties that bind individuals into relationships governed
by an ethic of care that balances reciprocal responsibilities instead of individual
rights.37
Feminist scholars find these same tensions at work between Antigone and
Creon in Sophocles' tragedy. 8 At the risk of death by stoning, Antigone re-
solves to bury her brother in spite of King Creon's decree that the body not be
buried. Fearing anarchy, Creon argues that the king, chosen to govern, must be
obeyed in all things, great and small, just and unjust. Antigone, her eyes on a
higher law beyond monarchy, stresses relationship and feeling above detach-
ment and objectivity. For Antigone, loyalty to the sibling bond outweighs a
justice defined by a bright-line test and deference to absolute legal authority. 9
Some see in the Antigone/Creon dispute Gilligan's two ethics in conten-
tion-the ethic of caring and the ethic of law and order.'
We began with Adam and Eve, proceeded through "historian" Mark
Twain, moved to the Old Testament, spent a moment with the Greeks, and
concluded with Carol Gilligan's Jake and Amy. The marvelous serendipity is
finding the same questions, frustrations, and frictions central to feminist legal
thought at work over time. It gives one the perspective to know that these is-
sues will not be resolved in this writing or in any other.
The lesson to be learned is not that men and women are different but that
within each of us are "male" and "female" characteristics which should be
expressed with intelligence and feeling. In the stories of Jake/Amy and
33. Genesis 18:11-15 and 21:1-8.
34. FOX, supra note 30, at 41. See also Siegel, supra note 14, at 6.
35. See FOX, supra note 30, at 47.
36. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 26.
37. See id. at 28. See also Siegel, supra note 14, at 8.
38. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 11. See, e.g., JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS 2-5
(1989); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1594, 1606-1614 (1991).
39. See SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, Trans. by RICHARD EMIL BRAUN, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (1973).
40. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 11.
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Antigone/Creon, the feelings-versus-logic conflict has been personified, magni-
fied, and "genderfied" for better viewing. These opposites are compensatory and
complementary. The healthiest individual or society expresses both with bal-
ance.41 When imbalance exists in the individual or society, an inevitable dis-
ruption and correction occur. The greater the imbalance, the greater the disrup-
tion or pain generated by correction. 42 In the individual, the disruption and
correction may range from men trying to get in touch with their softer side to
serious psychological pathology and treatment. In society, losses generated by
the Western world's male myopia are legion, including the loss of Myra
Bradwel's services as an attorney.43 Feminist thought is certainly a part of the
correction.
E. Back to Science
In spite of what Carol Gilligan, Carl Jung, and Melanie Griffith have to
say, the jury is still very much out on how different men and women really are.
Is it really true that female lawyers take a different approach to moral issues?
Are women really more caring, nurturing, result-oriented, feeling, and intuitive?
Are men more interested in rules, logic, and form over substance? Scholars
looking seriously at the question have discovered three positions.
1. Men's Ways Are Better
First-position supporters say there are significant personality/psychological
differences between the sexes; the man's way is better for the business or legal
world; the woman's way is suited to the home and family. This position's legal
zenith was reached in 1869 when the Illinois supreme court rejected Myra
Bradwell's application to practice law. The Illinois court proclaimed that "God
designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to
men to make, apply, and execute the laws."" The United States Supreme
Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Bradley's concurrence has become an anti-manifesto
for many feminists.
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man
is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life. [sic].... The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the Creator.45
41. See JUNG, supra note 6.
42. See Anthony Storr, THE ESSENTIAL JUNG-PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES AND THE SELF-REGULATING
PSYCHE (1983). See also C.G. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES (1971).
43. See discussion of Myra Bradwell's rejected application to practice law, infra notes 44-5.
44. In re Bradwell, 55 111. 535, 539 (1869).
45. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
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T. Lang may have brought this first position to it highest (or lowest) point
with the following language from a book entitled The Difference Between a
Man and a Woman:
It must be stated boldly that conceptual thought is exclusive to the mascu-
line intellect.... [I]t is no deprecation of a woman to state that she is
more sensitive in her emotions and less ruled by her intellect. We are
merely stating a difference, a difference which equips her for the special
part for which she was cast. ... Her skull is also smaller than man's; and
so, of course, is her brain.4
Lang's language might be laughable as a dated attempt at primitive craniology,
but for its date of 1971.
2. Women's Ways Are Better
Second-position supporters agree that fundamental differences exist in the
way men and women think and speak, but conclude that women's ways are
better. Much in vogue in the last 25 years, this position holds that by nature
women are more intuitive, feeling, and compassionate; that they experience
intimacy in relationships on a deeper level; and that there is wisdom in these
women's ways that male leadership has been missing for some 2,000 years.47
Carol Gilligan became this position's strongest voice.'e Thousands of women
saw themselves in Gilligan's articulation of their different voice and identified
with the frustrations described by Gilligan at not being listened to at all.49
Feminist writer Lindsey Van Gelder proclaimed,
[As] the traditional caretakers, women in this culture easily affiliate and
identify with others, value people's feelings, and tend to base moral codes
on the good of the entire group... [These] traditionally female values are
our best shot at changing consciousness-and saving the world.'
From the arts to economics to metaphysics, women's ways seemed to make
sense. Matthew Fox articulated a widely felt sentiment:
I am personally convinced that the most important development in Ameri-
can (and possibly in Western) spirituality in the past three years has been
the development of women's consciousness and the feminist perspective
in responding to life.5'
What used to be viewed as female weaknesses are now viewed as strengths.
Men emulate these women's ways and try to get in touch with their own feel-
ings, to hug, to cry, and to relate on a deeper level than the Dallas Cowboys
and the newest recipe for homemade beer.52
46. T. LANG, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN 203-204 (1971).
47. See supra note 24, at 82-83.
48. See discussion of Carol Gilligan and cultural feminism supra notes 15-31.
49. See supra note 24, at 82-83.
50. Lindsey Van Gelder, It's Not Nice to Mess with Mother Nature, MS MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at
60-63.
51. MATrHEw Fox, ON BECOMING A MAGICAL, MYSTICAL BEAR n. xx (1972).
52. See generally ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN (1990); SAM KEEN, FIRE IN THE BELLY - ON BEING A
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3. Men's and Women's Ways Are the Same
The third position is that no intrinsic differences exist in the way men and
women think, speak, and relate. Men and women are not, by nature, different at
all. Any anecdotal evidence to the contrary is solely the result of the position in
which the parties have been placed by cultural pressures or of generalizations
that cannot be validated by a closer look.
People enjoy dividing the world into opposites-it makes the world clear
and easy to understand.53 Why won't a man stop to ask for directions? Why
does my wife do well if you ask her to turn to the left, but disconnects if you
ask her to turn north? Why does she so often wonder what I am thinking? What
facts cause Erma Bombeck to comment that any man that will watch three foot-
ball games in a row should be declared legally dead? 4 Why do my spirits lift
as we drive into a hardware store parking lot while my wife's begin to sink? It
is tempting to say, "my spouse does weird things and it is because of his or her
gender." These generalizations are not confirmed by hard science, however.
Carol Tavris provides that hard science in her 1992 book The Mismeasure
of Woman-Why Women Are Not the Better Sex, the Inferior Sex, or the Oppo-
site Sex.55 Tavris empirically examined the reputed differences between men
and women, and found few, if any, are supported by real scientific evidence.
Men are not superior in math and science. Women are not superior in writing
and verbal skillsY Women are not more peace-loving and nurturing." For
example, any man or woman placed in a child-rearing role displays the same
amount of nurturing, warmth, compassion, and caring.59 Men are not more
warlike and aggressive.' When making moral decisions, men use care-based
or results-oriented reasoning as often as do women, and women rely on rules
and regulations as much as men.6' Men need intimacy and attachment as much
as women.62 Women do not come from Venus, and Men do not come from
Mars. We all come from the "third rock from the sun" and are pretty much
chips off the same rock.
Tavris agrees that men and women have different styles of expression but
contends that these styles do not indicate different capacities or even real per-
sonality differences.63 These styles are caused not by genetic or even learned
differences, but rather by the position, or what Tavris calls context, in which
women have been traditionally placed-positions with less power and authority
MAN (1991); ROBERT HICKS, THE MASCULINE JOURNEY (1993).
53. See supra note 14, at 90-92.
54. See CAROLYN WAGNER, TREASURY OF WOMEN'S QUOTATIONS 211 (1992).
55. See TAVRIS, supra note 24.
56. See id. at 95 and 296.
57. See id. at 52.
58. See id. at 63.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 66-71.
61. See Tauris, supra note 24, at 79-85.
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than those of men.'
Reputed gender differences are often created by the amount of authority or
power a woman is in a position to assert.' The more power or authority a per-
son has, the more direct, succinct, and clear is that person's language pattern.
The less power or authority a person has, the more timid, soft, and indirect are
that person's speech patterns-whether a man or a woman. Men and women in
the business world who enjoy an equivalent degree of authority display the
same kind of assertiveness, competence, and self-confidence.
Women's reputed intuition has developed from their being excluded from
positions of power.' Men and women in subservient positions rely on intu-
itions and feelings to deal with those in power. Men tend to develop more
power and authority as they proceed through their careers, whereas most wom-
en do not.'
Tavris pushes her "context" idea one step further by suggesting that how a
person acts depends on the gender of who that person is with. We "do" gender
unconsciously, adjusting our behavior depending on the gender of the people
with whom we associate.' We also worry about the gender issue when we are
the token.' When we worry about it, we tend to overreact one way or the oth-
er. As a judicial officer, of concern to me is the suggestion that in a group of
men, one or two women will become quiet and reticent, while those same wom-
en in a group of women would be bubbling over with ideas and energy. The
same is true of men in a group of women: I do not want gender differences to
intimidate a member of any group I am a part of, in or out of the courtroom.
The goal for both sexes should be to add new qualities and skills, not to
lose old ones. We must resist the temptation to see the world in terms of oppo-
sites - the Western inclination to think in dualities and divisions.' Are we ra-
tional or emotional? Are we shaped by nature or nurture? Are we masculine or
feminine? We should answer yes to all these questions and move on. The real
question should be, "What shall we do about us, all of us, so that our relation-
ships, our work, our children, and our planet will flourish?"7'
III. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
Women now account for 45% of students in law school and 23% of the
practicing bar 2 If this enrollment rate continues, projections are that 40% of
64. See id. at 294-295.
65. See id. at 297.
66. See id. at 65.
67. See Tauris, supra note 24, at 312.
68. See id. at 292.
69. See id.
70. See TAvRIs, supra note 24 at 90.
71. See TAVRIS, supra note 24.
72. See Kelly Lucas, Women in the Law: Coming ofAge, 40 RES GESTAE 30, 31 (1996); Amy E. Deck-
er, Women in Corporate Law: Rewriting the Rules, 4 AM. UJ. GENDER & L. 511, 511 n.2 (1996); Susan P.
Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the
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all attorneys in the year 2010 will be women.' "Between 1971 and 1991, the
number of men in the profession doubled while the number of women increased
sixteen-fold."74 This influx of women and the concomitant interest in
"women's ways" have generated substantial change in the American legal sys-
tem-a deep-rooted institution not easily moved.' It is at those roots that the
philosophical assumptions of our legal system are being questioned by what is
now referred to by most writers as feminist jurisprudence.
Jurisprudence is not an everyday word in the courtroom. It is the philoso-
phy of the law-the underpinnings that explain and support those things that
are said in the courtroom every day. Philosophies set their roots in academia
and then become the foundation upon which visible and valuable practical
applications are based. Feminist jurisprudence is not the first philosophical cri-
tique of the traditional rule-orientation of legal formalism or positivism.76 Karl
Llewellyn's legal realism,' Judge Richard Posner's emphasis on the economic
factors at work in the law,7" Duncan Kennedy's critical legal studies,79 and
John Rawls' "Justice as Fairness"' have been effective critiques of traditional
formalist roots. Feminist jurisprudence is a philosophy of the law based in
feminist thought. It shares the "situation sense" of the realists and of critical
legal studies but reflects a greater concern for context and community.8"
As a distinct body of academic inquiry, feminist jurisprudence is said to
have originated at a Harvard conference in 1978. Six years before, a pioneer-
ing legal scholar by the name of Ruth Bader Ginsburg had convened at New
York University Law School a two-day conference entitled The Law School
Curriculum and the Legal Rights of Women.83 Feminist jurisprudence is young
but just as significant as the major directions of study that preceded it; it is
described by one writer as the most powerful of the contemporary movements
in legal history.' Every woman lawyer is connected to it by gender, at least,
Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (Spring 1997).
73. See Lucas, supra note 72, at 31.
74. See id. at 30; Scales, supra note 15, at 1382.
75. See, Seigel, supra note 14, at 6.
76. Positivists, also referred to as objectivists, suggested that the law constituted "science", something
neutral, abstract, impersonal and universal to be applied with strict objectivity. For an overview of the major
critics of traditional objectivism see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVE-
MENT 5-14 (1983).
77. Legal Realism grew out of the rejection of Positivism, arguing that external factors varying from
economics to politics influenced legal doctrine and decisions. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence--The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930); Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
78. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
79. See UNGER, supra note 76.
80. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); and NORMAN DANIELS, READING RAWLS, CRII-
CAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1975). This highly influential work of moral and political philosophy
impacts legal theory on many fronts.
81. See Lanae Holbrook, Justice Barkett's Feminist Jurisprudence, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161, 1185
(1992); Siegel, supra note 14, at 6-7; Scales, supra note 15, at 1400. See also UNGER, supra note 76.
82. See Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 183, 183
(1994).
83. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Women and the Law: Taking Stock After Twenty-Five Years, 6 U.C.L.A.
WOMEN'S L.J. 279,281 (1996).
84. See Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 826 (1988) (Reviewing
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and can take pride in that fact.
One diversion must be dispatched. The mention of "feminism" rankles
many men and some women such that the hair on the back of their necks stands
on end, their eyes glaze over, and they stop listening.' My goal is to go be-
yond the excesses and the superficiality of political correctness and to find
viable the important contribution that women bring to legal theory. The phrase
"militant feminist" is an oxymoron as applied to the law. Feminism is about a
caring, results-oriented approach to the law-the opposite of militancy.
What has feminist jurisprudence brought to the law? What is the difference
between the law as it is (or as it was before women arrived) and as the femi-
nine perspective would have it be?' Professor Katharine Bartlett responds:
When feminists 'do law,' they do what other lawyers do: they examine
the facts of a legal issue or dispute, they identify the essential features of
those facts, they determine what legal principles should guide resolution
of the dispute, and they apply those principles to the facts. This process
unfolds not in a linear, sequential, or strictly logical manner, but rather in
a pragmatic, interactive manner.'
Bartlett adds that feminists go one or two steps further and seek "to expose how
the substance of law may silently and without justification submerge the per-
spectives of women and other excluded groups."' s Catherine MacKinnon con-
curs: "Simply by treating the status quo as 'the standard,' it invisibly and un-
critically accepts the arrangements under male supremacy. '
Context is important. "[F]eminist jurisprudence [does not] reject the Rule
of Law; [it] simply places more emphasis on personal experience, which is
accessed through empathy. Instead of using universal rules as a starting point
for analysis, [it] analyzes human experience to determine the applicability of
rules."
Feminism may help us see that what the universal aspirations are attempt-
ing to achieve may vary from context to context from small community to
large urban setting, from trial court to appellate court, from single judge
to collective judges, from commercial to constitutional law. If we under-
stand feminist skepticism not as rejecting all levels of generality but rather
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)). For the view that the project of mainstreaming
feminist issues has been largely neglected, if not abandoned in legal academe see Blumberg, supra note 83, at
282. "Although the occupants of this corner tend to be quite vociferous, even feisty, they largely preach to the
already converted in ghettoized small courses and seminars and do little or nothing to alter the fabric of the
traditional legal subject matter that deeply affects women's lives." Id. at 282.
85. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 1168. See generally ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT (1993).
Hughes discusses the excesses related to politically correct feminism with insight and humor.
86. For general discussions of feminist legal theory and jurisprudence, see, e.g., CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law:
The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., Feminist Juris-
prudence: The 1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5 (1991).
87. Bartlett, supra note 23, at 836.
88. Id.
89. See MACKINNON, FEINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 86, at 43.
90. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 1183.
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as reminding us of the limits and risks of such generalizing, we gain in
our ability to press beyond the talisman-like phrases.9'
The good lawyer does not limit inquiry to whether or not the defendant signed
the contract. The good lawyer inquires further. What are the relationships of the
parties? How will one solution harm that relationship and another not? Rules
and rights are not more important than the results and the specific facts of the
case?2 Substance, not form, should tip the scales of justice.
Feminist jurisprudence expresses a frustration with the tunnel vision that
results from excessive devotion to past and precedent, rule and regulation. Law
professor Ann Scales suggests this frustration as she borrows the words of
Dorothy Dinnerstein from The Mermaid and the Minotaur.3 Professor Scales
describes traditional male-created jurisprudence as a "compulsive concentration
on what can be predicted, controlled, manipulated, possessed and preserved,
piled up and counted. 94 Scales discusses the "male" concept of abstract uni-
versality, the inflexible application of the rule, and contends that it constructs a
"dark tunnel to its tainted delusion."
95
It made maleness the norm of what is human, and did so sub rosa, all in
the name of neutrality. By this subterranean system, the 'relevant' differ-
ences have been and always will be those which keep women in their
place.9
6
Traditional jurisprudence is objective, rights-based, rational, process-oriented (if
the process was followed, the result must be okay), and too often ignores con-
text and result. Feminist jurisprudence is relational, care-based, results-oriented,
and accepts inexactness.97
IV. THINKING LIKE A LAWYER
Feminist perspective is suspect of legal inquiry based in the traditional
process of "thinking like a lawyer."'
Law schools traditionally reward male-style linear thinking, and women,
who adopt it in order to survive and succeed, have begun to protest."
When law schools teach us "to think like a lawyer," they may really teach
us to "think like a man."' 0
91. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsideration of the Aspirations for our Judges, 61 S. CAL.
L REV. 1877, 1911 (1988).
92. See Pruitt, supra note 82, at 183.
93. See Scales, supra note 15, at 1403 n.63 (citing DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE
MINOTAUR (1977)).
94. Id. at 1390-91.
95. Id. at 1337.
96. Id. at 1378.
97. See id. at 1382-83.
98. See Pruitt, supra note 82, at 183.
99. Siegel, supra note 14, at 10.
100. Id. at 8.
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One writer calls for "critical attention to the nature of legal reasoning ... and
the extent to which it is male defined, and the extent to which its language and
its process of reasoning are built on male conceptions of problems and of
harms-and on male.., methods of analysis."'
My strongest recollection of the first days of law school is the repeated
instruction that I must learn "to think like a lawyer," described as the ability to
distinguish a legal from a nonlegal issue, to see the various sides of a problem,
to reason formally and logically, and to express ourselves clearly, concisely,
and unemotionally. The benefits of dispassionate analysis have been the bed-
rock of legal education from its inception. Negative consequences became ap-
parent, however, as legal educators searched for a solution to the Watergate-
induced credibility crisis, generating much commentary in the 1970's on the
emotional aridity of law school instruction." Cornell Law School Dean, Rog-
er Cramton, confirmed:
The law teacher must stress cognitive rationality along with 'hard' facts
and 'cold' logic and 'concrete' realities. Emotion, imagination, sentiments
of affection and trust, a sense of wonder or awe at the inexplicable-these
soft and mushy domains of the 'tender minded' are off limits for law
school students and lawyers.' 3
Having been- told that "you can't be a duck until you learn to quack," Scott
Turow complained of his first year at Harvard Law School that students were
"being limited, harmed, by the education, forced to substitute dry reason for
emotion to cultivate opinions which were 'rational' but which had no roots in
the experience, the life, they'd had before."'0 4 Little mainstream change or re-
sponse resulted from this cry of the 1970's. Feminists have taken up the call.
Feminist jurisprudence endorses a broader, value-based process of legal
reasoning, with expanded definitions of justice and standards of care.'05 The
literature on creativity and aesthetic perception has long recognized the superior
efficiency of a less structured, less directed method of inquiry."° Feminist ju-
risprudence suggests that lawyers would do well to listen more often to voices
101. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking the Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the' Gendered Nature of
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989).
102. See H. PACKER AND T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 30 (1972); Savoy, Toward
A New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 461 (1970); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85
HARV. L. REV. 392, 432 (1971). For the negative effects of "thinking like a lawyer," see Thomas E. Willging
& Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 306, 335 (1982); B. Boyer & Roger C. Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for
Research & Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 270 (1974); Erlanger & Klegon, Socialization Effects of Pro-
fessional School, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 11, 30 (1978); John 0. Mudd, Thinking Critically About Thinking
Like a Lawyer, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 704, 705 (1983). See also Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the Univer-
sity of Southern California Clinical Semester, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664 (1971); THOMAS L. SHAFFER AND
ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE 129 (1977); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951).
103. 'Roger Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 250
(1978).
104. SCOTr TUROV, ONE L 55, 81 (Warner Books 1988) (1977).
105. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 10. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 95, at 23.
106. See BREWSTER GHISELIN, THE CREATIVE PROCESS 222 (1952); JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE
(1934). See also ANTON EHRENZWEIG, THE HIDDEN ORDER OF ART xii (1967).
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not their own-in this case, those of artists and psychologists.
Psychology says that in ordinary analysis we quickly select the most sim-
ple and coherent pattern or answer that has good form and seems right, as
judged by our trained, habituated taste.'07 The law (or law professor) says we
should focus quickly on the pith of the problem and find the answer dictated by
code or case law. Both describe the process of "learning to think like a lawyer."
Like a horse with blinders, we race other horses with similar focus and restric-
tion, unable to see a different, possibly shorter and better path along the way.
In contrast, one author, whose background combines the law, psychology,
and art, recommends a different way of thinking. Anton Ehrenzweig, a former
law magistrate in his native Vienna and a lecturer in art education at the Uni-
versity of London, describes an ability to perceive and digest the whole picture
or concept without too quickly reducing it to a "pinned down" answer, pattern,
or "gestalt." 't In The Hidden Order of Art, Ehrenzweig recommends a
syncretistic thought process that melds the conscious and the subconscious,
preventing the conscious answer from crystallizing too quickly."° Ehrenzweig
says we should permit our intuitions and feelings to incubate in the murky
morass of the subconscious. He warns that too much structure and control of
the thought process may block creative thought and moral sense."'
Precise visualization or, worse still, a straining of one's attention to see
crystal clearness where there is in fact none, will only produce wrong or
unusable results."'
Feminist jurisprudence agrees that less thinking "like a lawyer" and more sensi-
tivity to feelings and intuition will produce more usable results, a higher moral
sense, and original, creative solutions." 2
This ability to search without having the answer, to perceive without dis-
section, and to achieve resolution or synthesis without lawyer-like precision or
precedent is a capacity to be developed. If we are able to yield control from
conscious-focusing to unconscious-scanning, and if we are open to the wisdom
of our subconscious thought processes, our creative, intuitive capacities can
emerge with original insight. Such "peripheral thinking" can improve the per-
formance of lawyers in the courtroom and in the office. If, however, surface
faculties react with defensive rigidity (what some would call male stubborn-
ness), original insight and moral sense from the subconscious are lost."3
Large corporations spend much time and money training their M.B.A.s and
J.D.s to be more creative in their thinking. Feminists say legal education should
do the same.
From within our own ranks, former Michigan Law School Dean Terrance
107. EHRENZWEIo, supra note 106, at 32.
108. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 106, at 11.
109. Id. at 9.
110. Id. at39.
111. Id. at 42.
112. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 10.
113. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 106, at 35, 38.
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Sandalow agrees that law schools have harmed lawyers' thought processes by
"excessive reliance on familiar categories of thought; and inability to tolerate
uncertainty; and sentimentality. '. a Columbia law professor Jack Himmelstein
talks about "becoming a lawyer" in a book by that name."'
Asking these questions without being diverted by the need to have 'the
answer' proved crucial.... [I]n legal education and practice, the rush to
find answers and the priority we put on having the answer can so limit
the breadth, depth and meaning of what we are doing that we lose sight of
who we are or what we are working toward."'
In summary, these artists, psychologists, and lawyers are saying that the
traditional, analytical, answer-oriented process of legal inquiry may miss the
forest for the trees. Creative solutions surface more readily when an individual
is not constrained by a totally linear thought process and is not blinded by past
and precedent. Feminist jurisprudence agrees and reminds us that in a law of-
fire the imagination should be used for more than looking for loopholes.
William Butler Yeats encapsulates the same sentiment:
God guard me from those thoughts men think
In the mind alone;
He that sings a lasting song
Thinks in a marrow-bone."
7
Feminist perspective emphasizes conciliation and negotiation to resolve
disputes."' This may be nothing more than a difference in attitude. The goal is
to facilitate resolution of the dispute as quickly and cheaply as possible with the
least damage to the parties and the community-not to throw down the gauntlet
and prepare for battle. A specific product of the feminist perspective is the
dramatic growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution and the settlement process.
The feminist perspective is not limited to women and is shared by many
men. Some women reject feminist thoughts, motives, and agendas whole-
sale."9 Others adopt them with widely diverse interpretations. t Some femi-
114. Sandalow, Legal Education: Reflections from the Academy, the Bench and the Bar, 37 RUTGERS. L.
REV. 579, 596 (1985).
115. See generally ELIZABETH DVORKIN, JACK HIMMLSTEIN, AND HOWARD LEsNICK, BECOMING A
LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
116. Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Edu-
cational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 515 (1978). See also ARTHUR
KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 173 (1964).
117. William Butler Yeats, A Prayer for Old Age, in THE POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 282 (Richard J,
Finneran ed., 1983).
118. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 30.
119. See Holbrook, supra note 81, at 1167 n.30.
120. See Bartlett, supra note 23, at 833-36 (discussing problems with the label "feminist" and arguing that
"use of the label 'feminist' has contributed to a tendency within feminism to assume a definition of 'woman'
or a standard for 'women's experiences' that is fixed, exclusionary, homogenizing, and oppositional, a tenden-
cy that feminists have criticized in others"). Accord ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1990). See
also Deborah R. Rhode, The Woman's Point of View, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39, 41 (1988) ("To assume that
feminism offers one theoretical stance is to miss a central point of recent feminist theory ....
[C]ontemporary feminists stress the inability of any single overarching framework, including a feminist one,
to provide an adequate account of social experience.").
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nists claim that women's experiences are essential to being a feminist, restrict-
ing the perspective to those born female. 2' Admittedly, most of the work fo-
cusing on the feminist perspective has been done by women, especially early
on; the perspective is also steeped in characteristics traditionally described as
female. However, most writers include men as well as women.' Feminist ju-
risprudence is simply the name given to describe a positive contribution to legal
thought that can be and is shared by both men and women.'
Feminist perspective is not only changing the law; it is changing things
about the way we physically practice law. The hard line between home and
work has been blurred. Part-time and flexible work hours are more accepted.
Work from the home and children at the office are more common-a healthy
change in attitude.'24
V. GENDER BIAs
If men and women have different styles of expression, for whatever reason,
are those differences being properly acknowledged and responded to in the
courts? Are there situations in which a woman is disadvantaged because of her
gender?
There are those who say gender bias does occur in the courtroom and the
only way for a woman to overcome it is to work longer and harder and be
better than her male counterpart." When Ginger Rogers was asked whether
Fred Astaire was truly the better dancer of the two, she responded by pointing
out that she had to do everything Astaire did, except she had to do it backwards
and in high heels.
Several courts have conducted surveys to examine the extent of gender
bias." In one such survey, 2,700 questionnaires were sent to lawyers in the
District of Columbia." Sixty-four percent of the surveys were returned. Thir-
ty-seven percent of the women who responded reported being addressed by
judges or other counsel as "honey," "dear," "young lady," or by their first
121. See Bartlett, supra note 23, at 833 n.7 (citing Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1294 n.91 (1987)).
122. See Scales, supra note 15, at 1373 n.2; LINDA GORDON, WHAT'S NEW IN WOMEN'S HISTORY IN
FEMINIST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 20, 30 (T. de Lauretis ed., 1986); Holbrook, supra note 83, at 1167
n.32.; Blumberg, supra note 83, at 283.
123. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and The Progress of the Law; The Forty-Second
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, 10 CARD. L. REV. 3 (1988) (suggesting that "[slensitivity to one's
intuitive and passionate responses, and awareness of the range of human experience, is therefore not only an
inevitable but desirable part of the judicial process ... "); Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in
Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1547 (1989); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF
THE LAW (1976) (asserting that judges emphasize rules too much and people too little).
124. See TAVRIS, supra note 24, at 128; Eve B. Burton, More Glass Ceilings Than Open Doors: Women
as Outsiders in the Legal Profession, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 566 (1996). See also Lucas, supra note 74,
at 34.
125. See Lucas, supra note 72, at 30.
126. See Laura Gatland, Courts Behaving Badly: Task Forces Say Some Judges Impatient With Job Bias
Cases, 80 A.B.A. J. 30 (1997).
127. Vicki C. Jackson, Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on
Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1668 (1996).
[Vol. 33":10191036
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss3/12
A SURVEY OF FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
names; twenty-nine percent reported having their physical appearance comment-
ed upon in a way that they perceived to be inappropriate; seventeen percent
claimed to have been exposed to unwanted sexual advances from clients, eleven
percent from co-workers, nine percent from supervisors, nine percent from
opposing counsel, and one percent from judges.'
Women also consistently reported feeling that they had been
disproportionately interrupted by men in courtroom arguments, during in-cham-
bers discussions with the judge, and in depositions or negotiations with other
lawyers."n Fifty-eight percent of the women, as compared to only four percent
of the men, felt they had been unfairly treated in this regard." Women also
reported a disproportionate experience of not being recognized in the courthouse
as a lawyer by court personnel. Judges of the United States Court of Appeal for
the District of Columbia Circuit have applauded' and condemned 32 the
survey.
As a judge, I want to know if influences in any courtroom make a man or
woman lawyer feel intimidated or disadvantaged. Small situations or irritants, if
they exist, should be acknowledged and resolved. Podiums are too tall for some
women, and microphones do not properly amplify softer voices. In chambers,
idle conversation about sports may make a man or woman lawyer who is not
interested in sports feel less a part of the process.
In or out of the courtroom, women need not adopt the traditional male role
model in dress or demeanor. If your natural personality is assertive-go with it.
If your natural personality is softer-stay with that. The quieter approach may
be the stronger for men or women. A superb example was provided by Su-
preme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her comments at the Oklahoma
Bar Association's 1997 Women In Law Conference.'33 Her restrained, soft-
hued presentation of well-chosen words conveyed considerable strength and
power. Anna Julia Cooper provided the words to begin this article, and it is
appropriate that she should assist in its close.
[W]omen are more quiet. They don't feel called to mount a barrel and
harangue by the hour every time they imagine they have produced an
idea."'
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1709.
130. See id. at 1727.
131. See Patricia Wald, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: A Reaction, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 603, 613
(1996).
132. See Laurence Silberman, The D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias: Political
Correctness Rebuffed, 19 HARv. L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 759 (1996).
133. Women in Law Conference, sponsored by the Oklahoma Bar Association, August 28, 1997.
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VI. CONCLUSION
I close with the words of the two women on the United States Supreme
Court. In the comments of Ruth Bader Ginsburg at her investiture as a Supreme
Court Justice at the White House, she noted that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
had recently quoted Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Jeanne Coyne, who had
been asked: Do women judges decide cases differently by virtue of being wom-
en? Justice Coyne responded that "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach
the same conclusion."'" Justice Ginsburg agreed and added that "women...
contribute... a distinctive medley of views influenced by differences in biolo-
gy, cultural impact, and life experience. A system of justice will be the richer
for diversity of background and experience. It will be poorer... if all of its
members are cast from the same mold."'' 3
Justice Ginsburg and Maurice Chevalier agree-"Vive, la difference.'9 37
135. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Investiture of United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1993) (remarks by Justice Ginsburg at her August 10, 1993 investiture at the
White House).
136. Id.
137. See Gigi, supra note 5.
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